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 In determining the proper scope of political liberalism and how it differs 
from comprehensive liberalism, one of the central test cases has been the civic 
education of children as future citizens. Rawls argues that political liberalism’s 
approach to education “has a different aim and requires far less” than 
comprehensive liberalism (Rawls 2005, 199).1 The politically liberal state would 
only require the kind of education needed so that children as future citizens can 
understand the political conception of justice and cultivate important political 
virtues (PL, 199). To do so, civic education aims at cultivating the reasonableness 
of children as future citizens.  
 However, in order for political liberalism to remain distinctively political, 
rather than collapsing into a version of comprehensive liberalism, Rawls must 
show that cultivating reasonableness should not require all children to learn 
comprehensive liberal values. The challenge Rawls raises to his conception of a 
political liberal civic education is whether “requiring children to understand the 
political conception in these ways is in effect, though not in intention, to educate 
them to a comprehensive liberal conception” (PL, 199).  
 In this paper, I consider the problem that children pose to understanding 
the scope and limits of Rawls’s Political Liberalism by focusing on the civic 
education of children as future citizens. Can a politically liberal state provide all 
children the opportunity to become reasonable citizens? Or does the cultivation of 
reasonableness require comprehensive liberalism? 
 In considering these questions, I show that educating children to become 
reasonable in the way Rawls outlines imposes a demanding requirement that 
conflicts with Rawls’s aim of including a wide constituency in the scope of political 
liberalism. Rawls’s aim of making reasonableness broadly inclusive for political 
purposes is in tension with his goal of using reasonableness as the standard that 
delineates the scope of liberal legitimacy. I argue that political liberalism can and 
should try to cultivate the reasonableness of its future citizens through the civic 
education of children. However, a defensible version of political liberal civic 
education requires introducing a bifurcation within Rawls’s conception of 
reasonableness. Political liberal civic education should aim towards the inclusive 
scope of reasonableness by cultivating reasonableness in only two of what appear 
to be three senses that Rawls emphasizes. Teaching children that legitimacy 
 
1 Hereafter I will cite Rawls’s Political Liberalism, expanded edition (2005) as PL.  
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requires embracing public reason demands more than may be justifiably required 
by a state that seeks to be broadly inclusive. 
 The argument proceeds in three parts. First, I survey the debate over 
political versus comprehensive liberal approaches to civic education (§1). Since 
one important goal of civic education is cultivating the reasonableness of future 
citizens, I outline (§2) the different criteria of reasonableness. I then (§3) consider 
which aims of political liberalism are embodied in each criterion for 
reasonableness and whether these are appropriate targets of civic education. I 
argue that political liberal civic education should aim to cultivate reasonableness 
as a moral notion that is tied to respecting one’s fellow citizens. This requires 
teaching children respect for the freedom and equality of one’s fellow citizens as 
equal moral persons and respect for the fact of reasonable pluralism, but need not 
include teaching children that legitimacy requires public reason. Teaching these 
two criteria sets the minimum threshold for qualifying as reasonable and, I argue, 
ensuring that children meet this threshold is the most important goal of a political 
liberal civic education.  
 
 
1. Political versus Comprehensive Approaches to Civic Education 
 An education aimed towards having citizens embrace the political 
conception of justice must first ensure that citizens are reasonable.2 The challenge 
concerning the civic education of children of unreasonable citizens is whether 
“requiring children to understand the political conception … is in effect, though 
not in intention, to educate them to a comprehensive liberal conception” (PL, 199).  
 In order to defend the distinctiveness of a political liberal civic education 
(PLCE) from a comprehensive liberal civic education (CLCE), Rawls argues that 
political liberalism’s approach to education “has a different aim and requires far 
less” than comprehensive liberalism (PL, 199). Unlike the comprehensive 
liberalisms of Kant, Mill, and Raz that would condone educational requirements 
promoting comprehensive conceptions of autonomy or individuality “as ideals to 
govern much if not all of life,” the politically liberal state would only require the 
kind of education needed so that children as future citizens can understand the 
political conception of justice and cultivate important political virtues (PL, 199). 
Rawls points to the “great differences in both scope and generality between 
 
2 Rawls argues that the publicity condition of the political conception of justice will itself play an 
educative role. The narrow role of the political conception of justice will ensure the “minimum 
condition of effective social cooperation,” for which the reasonableness of citizens is important. 
The wider role of the political conception includes the publicity condition, which is part of a 
citizen’s education. Publicity ensures that citizens are aware of the principles of justice embodied in 
political and social institutions and are also aware of how “citizens’ rights, liberties, and 
opportunities” are derived from “a conception of citizens as free and equal” (PL, 71). In this paper, 
I focus on the cultivation of reasonableness because this is a crucial first step for political liberal 
civic education and, thus, will be important in a child’s civic education. 
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political and comprehensive liberalism” and “hope[s] the exposition of political 
liberalism … provides a sufficient reply to the objection” (PL, 200). However, a 
number of philosophers and political theorists remain unconvinced that Political 
Liberalism contains a sufficient reply. 
 Common responses fall into three broad categories. First, some argue that 
when we examine civic education, the distinction between political and 
comprehensive liberalism collapses—Rawls fails to sufficiently distinguish the 
political liberal approach to civic education from comprehensive liberalism 
(Gutmann 1995; Callan 1996, 1997). Gutmann and Callan both argue that the 
educational implications of political liberalism converge with the educational 
implications of comprehensive liberalism insofar as civic education is intended to 
cultivate the reasonableness of future citizens.3 Because the effects of PLCE are no 
different from CLCE, Rawls’s political liberalism “is really a disguised instance of 
comprehensive liberalism” (Callan 1997, 13, 40).4 According to this line of 
response, not only did Rawls fail to distinguish PLCE from CLCE in his larger 
exposition of Political Liberalism—the very aim of cultivating reasonableness is 
precisely why the distinction between PLCE and CLCE collapses. Despite other 
differences between the systems’ methodological aims, there is no difference 
between comprehensive liberalism and political liberalism when it comes to the 
education of children.  
 Second, some defend the distinctiveness of a political liberal approach to 
education, arguing that PLCE is both distinctive and defensible. Political liberals who 
defend the distinctiveness of PLCE follow Rawls in emphasizing the difference in 
scope by defending the freestanding nature of political justification or the basic 
structure restriction that teaches only those virtues required for political 
participation. The aim of these theorists is to expand on Rawls’s own, insufficient, 
remarks and offer a direct reply to the charge that the distinction between PLCE 
and CLCE collapses. Macedo and Costa focus on political liberalism’s 
freestanding requirement by defending the justificatory neutrality of PLCE.5 This 
 
3 Gutmann (1995) argues that in requiring civic education to encourage mutual respect between 
citizens, Rawlsian political liberalism converges with comprehensive liberalisms in the effect it has 
on children. Callan argues that the fault lies in teaching children the burdens of judgment, which 
serves as a “a powerful constraint on the background culture of liberal politics” (1997, 36) such 
that the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism collapses. 
4 Mulhall (1998) also thinks the cultivation of reasonableness involves a comprehensive liberal 
conception of the person.  
5 Macedo emphasizes the freestanding component by showing that despite teaching civic virtues, 
politically liberal civic education remains neutral between reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
because they can be “publically justified independently of religious and comprehensive claims” 
(Macedo 1995, 477; See also Macedo 2000). Furthermore, this is the only form of neutrality we 
should expect. Claims to more “substantive” neutrality or fairness are “more apparent than real” 
(Macedo 1995, 484). However, the reasonableness component places important restrictions on the 
kinds of diversity permitted and hence Macedo defends “political liberalism with spine” (Macedo 
1995, 470). Costa follows Macedo in defending the justificatory neutrality of politically liberal civic 
education. She can agree with Callan that the cultivation of political virtues “will necessarily have 
a deep effect on citizens’ character” insofar as it requires the cultivation of reasonableness and in 
this sense a politically liberal civic education is not minimal. However, it is still distinctly political 
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line of response defends the distinction in justification between political and 
comprehensive liberal approaches to education, even while admitting the practical 
effects of these differences may not be significant. Davis and Neufeld argue that 
the freestanding component, on its own, is not a persuasive defense of political 
liberalism’s distinctive approach to civic education. Instead, they argue against the 
“convergence thesis” of Gutmann and Callan by emphasizing “both the basic 
structure restriction and the freestanding condition” (Davis and Neufeld 2007, 50, 
original italics removed). There are significant practical differences between 
teaching children to respect the burdens of judgment and teaching children to 
embrace comprehensive liberal autonomy because political liberalism restricts its 
discussions to the basic structure of society and the public political realm (Davis 
and Neufeld 2007, 62-67).6  
 Third, some argue that a politically liberal civic education is indeed 
distinctive—but not defensible because the reasonableness requirement is too 
permissive of different comprehensive conceptions of the good. Some feminists 
have objected that by tolerating a wide variety of comprehensive doctrines as 
reasonable, political liberalism erodes tools for securing equality between the sexes 
(Okin 1994, 2004; Exdell 1994; Baehr 1996; Yurako 1995, 2003).7 A central 
concern of these feminists is the basic structure restriction. As long as citizens are 
reasonable when engaged in public political debate, their nonpublic views are of 
no concern to political liberals. As Okin, Exdell, Baehr, and Yurako argue, many 
traditional religious practices in the private sphere undermine women’s equality, 
and thus including such religions as reasonable shows that political liberalism is 
indefensible without significant revision (Okin 1994, 2004; Exdell 1994; Baehr 
1996).8 Following a similar argument, that reasonableness is too permissive of 
different comprehensive doctrines to be defensible, Fowler has argued that 
because reasonableness is a lax criterion, political liberalism cannot protect 
children from certain damaging forms of upbringing (Fowler 2010, 368). These 
are important objections to the adequacy of political liberalism; however, 
adequately responding to these objections will go beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
because a politically liberal civic education is publicly justifiable (Costa 2004, 7-9). See also Costa’s 
extended discussion of the educational implications of Rawls’s theory of justice in Costa 2011.  
6 Costa also emphasizes the importance of teaching children the burdens of judgment in order to 
cultivate reasonableness (2009 and 2011).  
7 Hartley and Watson (2010) have defended Rawls from this charge, arguing that the reciprocity 
condition of reasonableness is restrictive enough to prohibit views that subordinate women to men. 
Okin has also argued that a robust form of civic education could counteract the problematic effects 
of comprehensive doctrines learned outside of the political realm (1994, 32); but note that the 
more robust the civic education is, the harder it will be to distinguish from comprehensive 
liberalism. 
8 Yuracko argues that due to the lax understanding of reasonableness, political liberalism should be 
rejected in favor of a feminist perfectionism (Yuracko 1995, 2003). Lloyd (1995), De Wijze (2000), 
and Nussbaum (2003) defend political liberalism from the feminist critique on the basis of this split 
between what should be accepted for political justice and what can be permitted in nonpolitical 
realms. However, the response has not been satisfying to many feminists who continue to doubt 
the acceptability of the split between one’s public and nonpublic practices (see, e.g., Okin’s 2004 
response to Lloyd and Nussbaum).  
CIVIC EDUCATION: POLITICAL OR COMPREHENSIVE?   
_______________________________________________________________________________  
5 
In this paper, I try to show that PLCE is distinctive and more defensible than 
CLCE as a form of civic education, but do so by arguing for a bifurcation within 
Rawls’s conception of reasonableness.9  
 All three lines of response agree that a political liberal civic education 
requires the cultivation of reasonableness. However, the differences lie in the 
implications of this requirement and whether, in light of this, political liberalism 
can be sufficiently distinguished from comprehensive liberalism. In the remainder 
of the paper, I suggest a new way to draw the distinction. This departs from Rawls 
in significant ways, since I think much of the confusion lies in the divergent 
implications of embracing the different components of reasonableness. I will show 
that political liberalism has a distinctive approach to civic education; however, I 
argue that a defensible version of PLCE requires introducing a bifurcation within 
Rawls’s conception of reasonableness.  
 
 
2. The Criteria for Reasonableness 
 A political liberal civic education should be designed to cultivate the 
reasonableness of children as future citizens. However, Rawls uses the 
qualification of reasonableness for at least two different aims: (1) setting a broadly 
inclusive scope of the type of pluralism that should be respected by the political 
conception of justice and (2) determining whether citizens’ arguments about 
political justice have appropriately used public reason in order to meet the 
standards of political liberal legitimacy. I will argue that Rawls’s aim of making 
reasonableness broadly inclusive for political purposes requires a conception of 
reasonableness that serves as a minimum moral threshold of respect for one’s 
fellow citizens.10 This is quite distinct from Rawls’s use of reasonableness as the 
standard that delineates the scope of liberal legitimacy. Educating children to 
become reasonable in all of the ways Rawls outlines requires more than would be 
justifiable for a broadly inclusive PLCE. 
 Recall that according to Rawls, reasonableness as a virtue of persons has 
several components.11 First is a moral requirement of respecting our fellow citizens 
 
9 I defend the conception of political liberal civic education that I propose from feminist objections 
in my dissertation, Political Liberalism and Its Feminist Potential. 
10 I defend the minimal moral threshold conception of reasonableness in my dissertation Political 
Liberalism and Its Feminist Potential.  
11 In Lecture II, Rawls specifies two basic aspects of reasonableness considered as virtues of 
persons rather than directly defining the concept (PL, 48). Herein, I discuss these as three 
components because I will argue that what Rawls identifies as the second basic aspect has two 
distinct components that should be bifurcated. Leif Wenar has detailed 5 different aspects of 
reasonableness for both persons and comprehensive doctrines and argues that only some of these 
can be met without violating the restrictions Rawls elsewhere places on a political conception of 
justice (Wenar 1995). For the purposes of this paper, I am interested in the basic requirements for 
being a reasonable person, as this is of interest to the question of civic education designed to 
cultivate the reasonableness of children as future citizens.  
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as free and equal moral persons. 12  Let’s call this the respect criterion of 
reasonableness. To be reasonable, one must recognize oneself and one’s fellow 
citizens as free and equal citizens who deserve fair terms of cooperation in 
society.13 The second basic aspect of reasonableness that Rawls identifies can be 
understood as a moral requirement of respect for our fellow citizens as free and 
equal reasoners. What is respected here is not our fellow citizens’ moral 
personhood, but their equal capacity to reason freely about one’s conception of 
the good. This aspect has two parts, which I will number separately for ease of 
exposition.14 One must:  
(2) recognize the burdens of judgment, which leads to recognizing the fact of 
reasonable pluralism and  
(3) accept the consequences of this recognition by using public reason when 
“directing the legitimate exercise of political power” on matters of 
constitutional essentials and basic justice (PL, 54). 
The burdens of judgment teach us that conscientious citizens may weigh evidence 
differently and come to differing, but equally reasonable, conclusions even after a 
full and free discussion has taken place (PL, 58).15 Thus, recognizing the burdens 
of judgment leads to the recognition of the fact of reasonable pluralism. Let’s call 
(2) the burdens of judgment criterion of reasonableness. Rawls also argues that 
reasonable persons must accept the “consequences” of this recognition by using 
public reason when debating matters of basic justice or constitutional essentials. 
Let’s call (3) the legitimacy criterion of reasonableness. Accepting that one must use 
public reason in matters of basic justice in order for political power to be 
legitimate is a way of demonstrating respect for persons, conceived of as free and 
equal reasoners, in light of the fact of reasonable pluralism. However, this 
criterion links the liberal principle of legitimacy to the basic qualification of 
reasonableness. Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy holds that, “our exercise of 
political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in 
accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably 
be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as 
reasonable and rational” (PL, 217). I discuss the tight connection between 
reasonableness and liberal legitimacy in section 3.3 below. 
 
12 There will likely be a plurality of ways to interpret free and equal moral respect; however, 
examining these various approaches goes beyond the scope of this paper.   
13 Rawls discusses the first basic aspect of reasonableness in PL, 49-54. Rawls explains, “persons 
are reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals, they are ready to proposed principles and 
standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that 
others will likewise do so” (PL, 49). Reasonable persons “desire for its own sake a social world in 
which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others” on fair terms (PL, 50, emphasis added).  
14 Rawls states, “the second basic aspect” of reasonableness “is the willingness to recognize the 
burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing the 
legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime” (PL, 54). 
15 PL, 54-58 describes the burdens of judgment in detail. 
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 When a political liberal civic education aims to cultivate the 
reasonableness of children as future citizens, we need to ask which aspects of 
reasonableness are the appropriate targets of civic education. Which criteria of 
reasonableness are compatible with the inclusive scope of political liberalism? 
Which make PLCE too restrictive to remain distinct from CLCE? 
 
 
3. Cultivating Reasonableness in Political Liberal Civic Education 
 
3.1. Inclusive Reasonableness in Civic Education: Cultivating the 
Respect Criterion 
 One aim of the qualification of reasonableness is to include as many 
people as appropriate within the scope of political liberalism. This is tied to the 
general motivation that moved Rawls away from the comprehensive liberalism of 
A Theory of Justice towards the more inclusive and pluralistic approach to liberal 
justice in Political Liberalism. Rawls’s key insight in Political Liberalism was to 
recognize that “a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive 
doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the 
framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime” (PL, xvi). 
This inevitable pluralism about morality creates difficulties in establishing a 
normative basis for a theory of justice. The solution Rawls proposed in Political 
Liberalism is to move away from comprehensive conceptions of justice, which are 
rooted in the truth of some moral theory, and towards a narrower political 
conception of justice, which is based on the overlapping consensus of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. 
 Rawls introduces reasonableness as a qualification intended to define the 
scope of plurality that political liberalism must address (PL, 36). Rawls 
distinguishes between reasonable pluralism and pluralism as such, arguing that political 
liberalism need only accommodate reasonable pluralism (PL, 36-37). 
Reasonableness should be seen as providing “minimal conditions appropriate for 
the aims of political liberalism” (PL, 60n.13). Rawls intends the qualification of 
reasonableness, in this vein, to be broadly inclusive of a diversity of comprehensive 
doctrines including “both religious and nonreligious, liberal and nonliberal” (PL, 
xxxviii ). Rawls conjectures that most current moral doctrines and religions, except 
for certain varieties of fundamentalism, could qualify as reasonable (PL, 170). 
 The respect criterion of reasonableness seems to be best suited for Rawls’s 
inclusive understanding of reasonableness. In distinguishing reasonable pluralism 
from pluralism as such, Rawls emphasizes that reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines still respect all people as moral equals. As Rawls explains, “all 
reasonable doctrines affirm … equal basic rights and liberties for all citizens” and 
doctrines that fail to do so are unreasonable (Rawls 2005b, 482-83). In addition, 
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people are unreasonable if they are unwilling to propose or honor fair terms of 
cooperation (PL, 50).  
 Teaching children to be reasonable in the inclusive sense tied to the 
respect criterion is an important goal of a political liberal civic education. Respect 
for the equal basic rights and liberties of all citizens is a necessary component of 
being reasonable. Without this basic respect, a conception of justice is morally 
dubious because it would permit the subordination of certain classes of people to 
others. Doctrines that subordinate certain races, classes, or genders to others 
would not qualify as reasonable insofar as they deny that everyone is entitled to 
equal basic respect simply in virtue of being moral agents. We need not tolerate 
Nazis or Ku Klux Klan members who deny the equality of their fellow citizens.16  
 Political principles should attempt to be fair and treat everyone as free and 
equal moral persons. A civic education designed to cultivate the respect criterion 
will emphasize moral respect for all citizens as free, equal, and deserving of fair 
terms of cooperation. Since reasonableness sets the boundaries for who should be 
included within the scope of political liberalism, it should be broadly inclusive of 
many different comprehensive doctrines. A civic education that emphasizes the 
respect criterion is well suited for this goal because, despite their differences, many 
comprehensive moral doctrines include an account of respect for people as free 
and equal. Those that do not value respect are rightfully excluded from political 
liberalism as unreasonable. Of course, unreasonable citizens will not suddenly 
loose their rights and be expelled from society. 17  However, unreasonable 
objections do not threaten the adequacy of the political conception of justice. 
Since political liberalism sets its scope as respecting reasonable pluralism, the 
political conception of justice should be able to be endorsed by all reasonable 
citizens. Political liberalism need not bend justice to accommodate the 
unreasonable because justice should not be held hostage to views that undermine 
equal moral respect for persons. 
 If civic education is designed to cultivate respect-reasonableness, PLCE 
could remain distinct from CLCE. If all that is required for PLCE is teaching 
children to respect their fellow citizens as free and equal with oneself, one need 
not even be a liberal to accept this educational goal—this is the most widely 
inclusive scope of reasonableness that should be tolerated.18 A comprehensive 
 
16 I also think the respect criterion shows why certain comprehensive doctrines that subordinate 
women also fail to be reasonable in the broadest conception of reasonableness. I argue for this in 
Political Liberalism and Its Feminist Potential.  
17 For more on the rights of unreasonable citizens, see Quong 2004.  
18 Note that this would be to deny Gutmann’s claim that teaching mutual respect is in effect to 
teach comprehensive liberalism. But Gutmann’s conception of mutual respect is a fairly 
demanding comprehensive conception of mutual respect. I agree with Davis & Neufeld (2007) that 
a politically liberal conception of respect will be more minimal.  
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liberal education requires far more than teaching that one’s fellow citizens should 
take one’s moral status seriously.19  
 In addition, if the state only requires that civic education meet the respect 
criterion of reasonableness, there may be more latitude for differential parental 
choice in education. Ebels-Duggan has recently argued that political liberals 
should allow reasonable citizens latitude in choosing the worldview in which their 
own children are educated, as long as this education does not insulate children 
from other views.20 I think the respect criterion of reasonableness could permit 
wide latitude on this front. In fact, the respect criterion alone is compatible with 
an education designed to promote the truth of certain comprehensive doctrines.21 
For example, religious schools could be a permissible choice for parents, provided 
that these schools teach children that all people should be respected as free and 
equal moral persons and that the terms governing our shared political life should 
be fair to all, including those who embrace different comprehensive doctrines. 
This shows that there may be many ways to satisfy the requirement that children 
learn the respect criterion of reasonableness—including education into 
comprehensive doctrines that seem quite distant from the larger aim of political 
liberalism. The important requirement is teaching children to respect their fellow 
citizens as free and equal, but there are many different ways of meeting this goal. 
As long as children are taught to respect themselves and all other citizens as free 
and equal moral persons, their education has met a minimum moral threshold for 
reasonableness. 
 Families cannot be permitted to inculcate children with beliefs or practices 
that undermine their ability to respect themselves or others as free and equal 
citizens. As Rawls, explains, political principles “guarantee the basic rights and 
 
19 This respect criterion of reasonableness is consistent with defenses of political liberalism’s 
distinctiveness that emphasize the freestanding nature of public political justification and with 
defenses that emphasize the basic structure restriction. Respecting people as free and equal is one 
of the more stable considered convictions that form the touchstone of Rawls’s reflective 
equilibrium procedure. Further, the basic structure restriction combined with the respect criterion 
yield a quite broad scope for incorporating comprehensive doctrines that differ on how best to 
respect people as members of religious organizations as long as the principles of justice protect 
citizens as free and equal throughout all realms. 
20 Ebels-Duggan 2013. It is worth noting that Ebels-Duggan’s example to show that non-neutrality 
is permissible is that a parent or teacher can expose children to the existence and content of racist 
views while also teaching children such views are wrong (2013, 46). Distinguishing the respect 
criterion of reasonableness shows clearly why this example actually concerns exposure to an 
unreasonable comprehensive doctrine. The racist doctrines are unreasonable because they do not 
respect all people as free and equal moral persons. Thus, this case may not compellingly show that 
all such instances of exposing children to other views while teaching them the truth of one’s own 
view is a permissible practice for political liberalism. However, the respect criterion alone will not 
settle this issue. 
21 It is important to emphasize that teaching the respect criterion could be compatible with an 
education promoting the truth of a comprehensive doctrine and not that teaching the truth of a 
comprehensive doctrine is required for this purpose. Below, I will argue that teaching the respect 
criterion is not sufficient for political liberal civic education, teaching the burdens of judgment is also 
required. 
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liberties, and the freedom and opportunities, of all [members of the family]. … 
The family as a part of the basic structure cannot violate these freedoms” (Rawls 
2005b, 469). The need to respect the freedom and equality of all is one of our 
firmly established convictions in contemporary society. An overlapping consensus 
on this conviction should be able to be supported by any comprehensive doctrine 
that can be counted as reasonable for the purpose of political justice.22  
 In summary, a civic education designed to teach children to respect 
themselves and their fellow citizens as free and equal will be widely inclusive. Few 
of the moral and religious doctrines in society would find reason to reject a civic 
education designed to promote reasonableness is this sense. Thus, political liberal 
civic education promoting the respect criterion of reasonableness will not collapse 
into comprehensive liberal education. Many moral and religious doctrines could 
be included on this basis, including those that may reject liberalism.23 
 
3.2. Inclusive Reasonableness and Civic Education: Teaching the 
Burdens of Judgment 
 One might object that simply requiring the state to cultivate the respect 
criterion of reasonableness is not a distinctively political liberal civic education. After 
all, I have suggested one need not even be a liberal to embrace the respect 
criterion of reasonableness. For civic education to be distinctive to political 
liberalism it requires more than simply teaching the respect criterion. The respect 
criterion is an important minimum threshold for distinguishing between 
reasonable and unreasonable comprehensive doctrines, but political liberalism 
also requires respect for the fact of reasonable pluralism. To learn the difference 
between pluralism as such and reasonable pluralism, children must learn to 
recognize that people who hold differing comprehensive doctrines are nevertheless 
capable of being reasonable. For this, learning the burdens of judgment is 
important. A civic education that teaches children the respect criterion and the 
burdens of judgment criterion will be distinctive to political liberalism while 
maintaining the broadly inclusive scope of reasonableness.  
 In order to respect those who disagree with us as reasonable, we must 
learn to recognize that citizens who hold different comprehensive doctrines are 
nevertheless reasonable insofar as they embrace the respect criterion. Teaching 
children the burdens of judgment is an important way in which PLCE can 
cultivate this respect for reasonable disagreement.24 Recall that the burdens of 
 
22 Here I use overlapping consensus at a different stage than Rawls does in his defense of Political 
Liberalism, which follows a strategy similar to Quong’s (2011, 161-191). However I am using this for 
illustrative purposes to show the wide consensus on respecting people as free and equal. 
23 Liberalism includes more than simply respecting the freedom and equality of persons. 
Liberalism often also includes a commitment to the moral priority of individuals over the group 
and, as a political theory, typically focuses on how states should treat individuals in light of these 
other commitments.  
24 It is possible that there are other ways in which children could learn to embrace the fact of 
reasonable pluralism and the reasonableness of their fellow citizens. For example, religious decree 
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judgment identify the sources of disagreement between reasonable persons. Rawls 
lists six of the “more obvious sources” of reasonable disagreement: complexity of 
the evidence, disagreement about the relative weight of relevant considerations, 
the indeterminacy of political concepts, the way our experience shapes our 
understanding and weighing of moral and political values, that there are different 
kinds of normative considerations on both sides of an issue, and finally, the fact 
that not every moral and political value can be realized in social institutions (PL, 
56-57).  
 Rawls’s enumeration of the sources of reasonable disagreement has been 
widely contested, with commentators arguing that many of these sources are, 
themselves, reasonably contestable. Callan draws on this controversy to argue that 
PLCE collapses into CLCE (Callan, 1997). Thus, including the burdens of 
judgment in PLCE may seem inappropriately restrictive. However, regardless of 
Rawls’s list of the sources of disagreement, the essential point behind teaching the 
burdens of judgment to children is not subject to similar contestation. Focusing on 
the motivation Rawls is trying to capture in his discussion of the burdens of 
judgment helps us see why including the burdens of judgment criterion in PLCE 
does not threaten collapse into CLCE.  
 The key point behind learning the burdens of judgment is understanding 
that those with whom one disagrees can nevertheless be reasonable. Rawls 
explicitly defines reasonable disagreement as “disagreement between reasonable 
persons: that is, between persons who have realized their two moral powers to a 
degree sufficient to be free and equal citizens in a constitutional regime, and who 
have an enduring desire to honor fair terms of cooperation and to be fully 
cooperating members” of society (PL, 55). The reasonableness of persons is defined 
in terms of their acceptance of the respect criterion—political principles should be 
fair terms of cooperation among free and equal citizens.25 The burdens of 
judgment essentially show that reasonable pluralism is possible. It is possible for 
people who respect each other as moral equals to nevertheless embrace quite 
different moral and religious doctrines. To recognize the fact of reasonable 
pluralism, a person must therefore learn that her fellow citizens who hold different 
 
that all god’s children be respected as free and equal reasoners. Herein I focus on teaching the 
burdens of judgment as a part of PLCE because I think this is likely the best way to cultivate this 
respect for one’s fellow citizens as free and equal reasoners in a way that is compatible with 
respecting differences between citizens’ conception of the good. However, I leave open the 
possibility that some religions could cultivate the appropriate form of respect in other ways. I thank 
Leif Wenar for pressing me on this objection. 
25 I set aside discussion of the two moral powers and full cooperation, as these are the ways Rawls 
defines persons for the purposes of political liberalism. He defines a person as someone who can be 
a “fully cooperating member of society over a complete life” and “we ascribe to them the two 
moral powers … namely, a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the 
good” (PL, 18-19).  
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comprehensive doctrines can disagree with her—and that disagreement does not 
mean that they are either unintelligent or immoral.26  
 Understood in this way, teaching children the burdens of judgment is 
important for developing the ability to respect one’s fellow citizens as not only free 
and equal moral persons, but also as free and equal reasoners. Differences in 
beliefs need not impugn the intelligence of one of the parties. We should respect 
that other people have reasons for their beliefs, even if we disagree. As equals, we 
should respect one another’s freedom to make important choices for oneself and 
to reason according to one’s own lights. We must respect our fellow citizens’ rights 
to embrace different comprehensive doctrines and make different decisions about 
how best to pursue the good life.  
 Respecting our fellow citizens’ decisions need not imply a smuggled in 
commitment to comprehensive liberal autonomy. Rawls considers the freedom of 
citizens to pursue their chosen conception of the good, provided it is reasonable, 
to be a part of the rational autonomy of citizens, which he considers “but an 
aspect of freedom” (PL, 74-75). But rational autonomy is distinct from both full 
political autonomy and full ethical autonomy.27 In Rawls’s terms, full ethical 
autonomy corresponds to the kind of autonomy promoted in comprehensive 
liberalism. Protecting citizens’ freedom to embrace different comprehensive 
doctrines and pursue what one embraces as valuable does not limit the range of 
comprehensive doctrines one can embrace.28 It is perfectly permissible to embrace 
the doctrine of one’s family or community. In fact, those who reject the 
importance of liberal autonomy could still embrace this right to live according to 
one’s preferred comprehensive doctrine because this right protects the right of 
those who reject comprehensive liberal autonomy to pursue other shared values. 
The political conception of justice protects the freedom of individuals to pursue 
varying conceptions of the good, provided that these conceptions respect all 
people as free and equal moral persons. 
 How should PLCE teach children that disagreement need not imply 
stupidity or immorality? One way to do so is to examine the reasons behind 
different comprehensive doctrines. Children could be taught some of the basic 
reasoning behind different major world religions and moral theories, in particular 
how each contains an account of moral respect for people as free and equal.29 
This could be presented neutrally, without any commitment to ranking the 
 
26 Rawls contrasts reasonable disagreement with unreasonable disagreement. The sources of 
unreasonable disagreement include being immoral, selfish, prejudiced, irrational, or simply “not 
very bright” (PL, 55 and 58). 
27 See PL, 72-81 for Rawls’s discussion of the contrast between rational, political, and ethical 
autonomy. 
28 The minimum qualification is that comprehensive doctrines meet the respect criterion. 
29 I believe there are at least consistent interpretations of all major world religions that include a 
conception of respect for persons as free and equal. Of course, there are also interpretations that 
would not meet the respect criterion. With Rawls, I think fundamentalists probably are not 
reasonable. Likewise, justifications of slavery (regardless of historical attempts to justify slavery by 
drawing on religious sources) are not reasonable. 
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different theories, as it should be in state run schools. Or, if parents preferred a 
religious education, neutrality need not be required. One good example of non-
neutrality that nevertheless meets the requirements of PLCE is a Catholic school 
education. Typically, such schooling includes required religion courses. However, 
religion courses are not simply indoctrination of the Catholic faith. They also 
include exposure to a wide variety of religions and moral theories even though 
there is an underlying presumption that Catholicism is the true religion. To me, it 
seems as if such an education meets the requirements for PLCE even though, 
since the school is not run by the state, Catholicism is presented as true. Students 
still learn that other faiths and moral theories are reasonable, and that different 
moral and religious doctrines still embrace the freedom and equality of all.30  
 
3.3. Restrictive Reasonableness and Civic Education: The Legitimacy 
Criterion 
 In addition to using reasonableness to delineate the scope of reasonable 
pluralism, Rawls also uses the qualification of reasonableness in a more restricted 
sense that is tied to the legitimacy of political principles. In this section, I will 
argue that the use of reasonableness for liberal legitimacy is tied to a different part 
of the political liberal project and, for the purposes of PLCE, should not be 
bundled with the other two criteria of reasonableness. 
 The third criterion of reasonableness holds that one accepts the 
consequences of the burdens of judgment by using public reason in directing the 
legitimate exercise of political power. Failure to use public reason constitutes a 
failure to offer a legitimate justification of coercive power and, for Rawls, a failure 
to accept “the consequences” of the burdens of judgment. Note the similarities 
between Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy and the legitimacy criterion of 
reasonableness. According to Rawls, the “second basic aspect of reasonableness” 
is “the willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their 
consequences for the use of public reason in directing the legitimate exercise of 
political power in a constitutional regime” (PL, 54). I think accepting the burdens 
of judgment can be separated from accepting the use of public reason.31 I have 
called the latter the legitimacy criterion of reasonableness because of its 
resemblance to the liberal principle of legitimacy. Recall that the liberal principle 
 
30 History, literature, and philosophy are also subjects that could expose children to the burdens of 
judgment and the fact of reasonable pluralism. By learning the many ways in which beliefs change 
over time and vary according to our culture and circumstance, children can start to learn that 
differences in beliefs are expected given the diversity of people’s experiences. Likewise, literature 
exposes children to alternate ways of living by people who have clear reasons for their actions, aim 
to live a good life, and, often, desire to be moral. The disagreements between philosophers in any 
era are another good source of learning that smart people who aim explicitly at discovering what is 
just or good, nevertheless reasonably disagree with each other. These kinds of disagreements seem 
to motivate Rawls’s initial turn to political liberalism (PL, xiii-lx). 
31 I defend the bifurcation of Rawls’s second basic aspect of reasonableness my dissertation, Political 
Liberalism and Its Feminist Potential. Here, I focus on why the separation is important in the context of 
civic education. 
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of legitimacy holds that, “our exercise of political power is proper and hence 
justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials 
of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of 
principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational” (PL, 217). 
The basic idea is that the only way for political power to be legitimate is for the 
basic principles and laws governing our political system to be grounded in terms 
that all reasonable citizens can be expected to endorse as relevant reasons 
governing the specific actions or laws.  
 Educating children to embrace the legitimacy criterion of reasonableness 
requires teaching all children to use public reason when debating matters of basic 
justice or constitutional essentials. To meet the legitimacy criterion of 
reasonableness, children would need to be taught that appealing to the whole 
truth of one's comprehensive doctrine, when that truth is reasonably contestable, 
is disrespectful and a way of illegitimately imposing one’s own comprehensive 
doctrine on others. Rawls explains that “insistence on the whole truth in politics 
[is] incompatible with democratic citizenship and the idea of legitimate law” 
because political legitimacy is “based on the criterion of reciprocity,” which holds 
that the reasons offered must be reasonably acceptable to our fellow reasonable 
citizens whose comprehensive doctrines may conflict with our own (Rawls 2005b, 
446-47). This is far more restrictive than simply requiring that children respect 
others as free and equal citizens, part of which requires accepting the idea that 
people could disagree with someone without being immoral or unintelligent (i.e., 
embracing only the respect and burdens of judgment criteria). The legitimacy 
criterion also teaches children that the best way to respect reasonable 
disagreement in political life is the use of public reason.  
 However, the liberal principle of legitimacy is a distinctive solution to the 
question of what could make the coercive power of the government legitimate. It 
is a substantive conclusion with which many who satisfy the respect criterion of 
reasonableness could disagree. I think this criterion is far too restrictive if included 
in PLCE as a necessary criterion for reasonableness. While the liberal principle of 
legitimacy is arguably the best way to respect reasonable disagreement, it is not 
the only way. Philosophical anarchists, liberal perfectionists, and libertarians all 
disagree with political liberalism’s solution to the problem of legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, all agree that people should be respected as free and equal. The 
differences arise in how political power can best respect freedom and equality. For 
example, philosophical anarchists would teach children that there is no such thing 
as a moral right to be obeyed precisely because it is incompatible with the 
freedom and equality of persons. This seems like a perfectly acceptable 
justification of the rejection of legitimate authority and one that is not based on 
immoral or unintelligent considerations. The anarchist justifies her rejection of 
legitimate authority by appealing to the very same respect criterion of 
reasonableness, which holds that citizens should be respected as free and equal 
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moral persons, that lies at the heart of Rawls’s conception of reasonable persons.32 
Thus, according to Rawls, the anarchist would qualify in one sense as a 
reasonable person because she respects the important moral respect threshold for 
being reasonable. However, using the restrictive sense of reasonableness, defined 
in terms of the legitimacy criterion—which the anarchist rejects—she would be 
unreasonable. The question is whether legitimacy-reasonableness should be 
included as a necessary component of reasonableness for the purposes of PLCE.  
 I have argued (in 3.1 and 3.2) that the respect criterion and burdens of 
judgment criterion are necessary components of the moral qualification of 
reasonableness and should be included in PLCE. I have also argued that these two 
criteria preserve the inclusive scope of reasonableness that is tied to Rawls’s 
conception of reasonable pluralism. But if the legitimacy criterion is also a 
necessary component of reasonableness, then reasonableness becomes far more 
restrictive—only those who embrace Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy would 
qualify as reasonable. This restrictive conception of reasonableness is not 
appropriate for PLCE.  
 Civic education that cultivates respect for freedom and equality seems 
justifiable, even if it has a disproportionate effect on certain comprehensive 
doctrines. Despite the political liberal’s goal of justifying political power in a way 
that respects deep disagreement between different comprehensive moral doctrines, 
the political liberal need not tolerate those views that threaten the very conditions 
of freedom and equality in a society. But I think it is a further step to argue that 
those who fail to embrace political liberalism’s liberal principle of legitimacy pose 
the same kind of threat to society. Provided that people embrace the respect 
criterion of reasonableness, they have recognized the moral status of their fellow 
citizens as free and equal.  
 However, there are many different ways that political theories justify or 
reject the legitimacy of coercive power, including many which also embrace the 
moral freedom and equality of citizens. As such, justifying the inclusion of the 
legitimacy criterion as a necessary component of reasonableness in civic education 
becomes far more difficult. Rawls raises the challenge of children’s civic education 
when considering whether or not political liberalism treats justly those 
comprehensive doctrines that fair the worst under political liberalism (PL, 197-
200). Justifying PLCE seems far more straightforward if all that is required in 
order to cultivate reasonableness in children is a civic education designed to teach 
respect for the freedom and equality of all people and that disagreement does not 
mean our opponents are immoral fools. The justification for teaching children one 
answer to how coercive power could be legitimate seems like a much taller order. 
It may very well be defensible, but it is a far more restrictive understanding of 
reasonableness.  
 
32 Recall that in explaining reasonable disagreement, Rawls defines reasonable persons by 
referencing the respect criterion of reasonableness (PL, 55). 
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 If, in order to be reasonable, children should learn to embrace a particular 
solution to the problem of legitimacy, a political liberal civic education would be 
as demanding as a comprehensive liberal civic education. This would succumb to 
the worry Rawls articulated at the outset—that a political liberal civic education 
would be in effect if not in intention to educate children for comprehensive liberalism 
(PL, 199). Even if the justifications for these two forms of education diverge, as 
Macedo and Costa have emphasized, the practical results would be similarly 
restrictive (Macedo 1995; Costa 2004).33  
 Furthermore, an education designed to teach children the liberal principle 
of legitimacy as a necessary component of reasonableness seems particularly 
vulnerable to Brighouse’s famous challenge to liberal civic education. Recall that 
within the family of liberal theories of legitimacy,34 many require the “free and 
unmanipulated assent of reasonable citizens”  (Brighouse 1998, 726). Brighouse 
argues that civic education tends to condition and manipulate the assent because 
civic education is specifically designed to promote “loyalties, habits, and beliefs 
conducive to” the continued stability of the state (Brighouse 1998, 726).35 Thus, 
Brighouse argues, civic education seems to undermine the very conditions for 
liberal legitimacy.  
 Brighouse’s challenge can be taken to apply to a Rawlsian who requires 
that civic education promote a particular solution to the problem of legitimacy as 
a part of educating children to become reasonable citizens.36 If one is educated 
from early childhood that there is one clear solution to the question of what, if 
anything, could make the coercive power of the state legitimate, this may tilt the 
scale in favor of a citizenry that is less likely to critique the government’s coercive 
use of power. In all liberal theories of legitimacy, the acceptability of the 
government to citizens is important.37 However, if education promotes the 
acceptance of the legitimacy criterion of reasonableness, then the extent to which 
legitimacy is freely obtained is threatened. Any education that teaches only one 
acceptable solution to the problem of legitimacy looks worrisome, because there 
are many competing theories of legitimacy that all claim to be the best way to 
 
33 What I have called the legitimacy criterion has not been the focus of arguments about civic 
education. But Rawls’s second aspect of reasonableness, taken as a whole to include the 
recognition of the burdens of judgment and their consequences, have lead many to conclude that 
political and comprehensive liberalism converge. 
34 There are a number of different approaches to liberal legitimacy beyond Rawls’s own favored 
approach articulated in Political Liberalism. 
35 Brighouse argued against Galston’s and Gutmann’s proposals for civic education and ultimately 
concluded that more robust training for autonomy and critical scrutiny could mitigate the worries. 
Brighouse 1998, 734-736, 739. He argues, “civic education can meet the requirements imposed by 
legitimacy only if tied to autonomy-facilitating education, which in turn can be justified on 
independent grounds” (Brighouse 1998, 744). 
36 Callan 2000 responds to Brighouse’s challenge but does so in a way that leans heavy towards 
comprehensive liberalism. Indeed, the distinction between political and comprehensive liberalism 
is not at stake in Callan’s 2000 essay.   
37 Differences between liberal theories of legitimacy often lie in articulating how this acceptability 
is obtained (hypothetical consent, normative consent, explicit voluntary consent, etc.).  
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respect the freedom and equality of citizens—including philosophical anarchism, 
which rejects the possibility of legitimate authority. Furthermore, including one 
model of legitimacy in children’s civic education is particularly troublesome since 
civic education is monitored by the very government that seeks to establish its own 
legitimacy. This could be understood as an instance of the state’s coercive use of 
force to encourage a shared understanding of the best way in which to respect 
citizens as free and equal.38  
 Education aimed at cultivating only one acceptable approach to 
establishing the legitimacy of the government demands more than may be 
justifiably required by a state that seeks to be broadly inclusive. Note the 
restrictions that accompany the inclusion of the legitimacy criterion of 
reasonableness in civic education. Only those who embrace Rawls’s liberal 
principle of legitimacy would qualify as reasonable citizens. This would exclude 
many more citizens as unreasonable. According to Rawls, using public reason 
when debating matters of basic justice and constitutional essentials is the best way 
to respect our fellow citizens as free and equal in the context of reasonable 
pluralism; however, it is not the only way. It is far too restrictive and, as such, has 
drawn the most vehement criticisms of Rawlsian reasonableness.  
 Beyond being restrictive, the legitimacy criterion is indefensible as a 
component of the civic education of children. Following Brighouse, I worry that 
some forms of civic education could undermine the legitimacy of a government. 
In particular, if children are taught that there is only one appropriate response to 
the fact of reasonable pluralism, this may undermine future political debate about 
criteria for legitimacy. While debate about legitimacy is not foreclosed by 
including the legitimacy criterion of reasonableness in the civic education of 
children—it would be significantly curtailed when compared to civic education 
that teaches children only the respect and burdens of judgment criteria of 
reasonableness. If PLCE is modeled after the inclusive conception of 
reasonableness that does not consider embracing Rawls’s liberal principle of 
legitimacy a necessary component of qualifying as reasonable, this opens the door 
to an education that presents a variety of theories of legitimacy. Children would 
learn that there is not only reasonable disagreement about conceptions of the 
good, but also reasonable disagreement about the best way to respect the freedom 
and equality of citizens in the context of reasonable pluralism.  
 In addition, including the legitimacy criterion as a part of PLCE will 
distract from some of its more significant educational aspirations. Since Rawls’s 
liberal principle of legitimacy is widely contested, even among liberals, including 
the legitimacy criterion as a necessary part of PLCE could lead many to reject 
PLCE entirely. In contrast, if PLCE teaches that the first two criteria are the only 
necessary qualifications to be considered reasonable, this is both widely inclusive 
and could establish an important basis for securing the rights of all citizens.  
 
38 This looks suspiciously similar to what, in other contexts, Rawls calls “the fact of oppression” (PL, 
37). 
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 Focusing on respect for others as free and equal moral persons as the 
primary moral qualification to qualify as reasonable highlights the key moral 
threshold that sets the limits for which disagreements are reasonable and which 
are unreasonable. If reasonable disagreements are disagreements among 
reasonable persons, they are disagreements among persons who have met this 
minimum moral threshold. Beyond this, there are many conceptions of the good 
that persons will pursue, given freedom of conscience and freedom of thought. 
Furthermore, as I have suggested in this section, there are also many different 
political proposals that explicitly aim to respect people’s freedom and equality. 
Teaching children these goals in PLCE could set the stage for a diverse citizenry 
that, by learning to respect even those with whom one disagrees as reasonable, 
may be less vulnerable to the extreme group polarization that characterizes 
contemporary politics in which those who disagree on important matters are 




 A political liberal civic education should aim towards the inclusive scope of 
reasonableness by cultivating the respect and burdens of judgment criteria of 
reasonableness. These two criteria should set the minimum moral threshold for 
qualifying as reasonable, which is the most important goal of PLCE. If we do this, 
PLCE will be far more inclusive of a variety of comprehensive doctrines than any 
comprehensive liberal civic education. In so doing, we could make good on 
Rawls’s claim that PLCE requires far less than CLCE. Nevertheless, this type of 
civic education would also be distinctive to political liberalism, as teaching 
children the burdens of judgment teaches them that political justice ought to 
respect reasonable pluralism among its citizenry. However, if PLCE requires 
cultivating the more demanding acceptance of the legitimacy criterion of 
reasonableness, it may risk collapse into comprehensive liberalism—at least in its 
practical effects. Including the legitimacy criterion in civic education as a 
component of reasonableness will have the practical effect of making it the case 
that only political liberals would qualify as reasonable citizens. To preserve a 
distinctive political liberal civic education, the legitimacy criterion should be 
bifurcated from the other aspects of reasonableness. Teaching children to 
embrace a particular approach to liberal legitimacy is not the proper aim of a 




39 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2014 Manchester Center for Political Theory 
Workshop and at Vanderbilt University’s Social and Political Thought Workshop. My thanks to 
the audiences at both workshops for their thoughtful comments. A special thanks to Marilyn 
Friedman, Rob Talisse, Larry May, Leif Wenar, and the editors of this volume for their helpful 
suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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